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	How	do	we	know	what	we	believe?	Gilbert	Ryle	is	often	credited	with	the	view	that	we	know	what	we	believe	in	much	the	same	way	that	we	know	what	others	believe:	namely,	by	inference	from	observation	of	behavior.	This	Rylean	view	cannot	explain	all	of	our	self-knowledge,	however,	since	we	can	know	what	we	believe	even	when	our	beliefs	make	no	relevant	causal	impact	on	our	behavior.1	In	opposition	to	this	Rylean	view,	I	will	assume	that	there	is	an	epistemic	asymmetry	to	be	drawn	between	first-personal	and	third-personal	ways	of	knowing	what	we	believe.	Each	of	us	has	some	way	of	knowing	what	we	ourselves	believe	that	is	peculiar	in	the	sense	that	it	is	different	from	any	of	our	ways	of	knowing	what	others	believe.	What	is	more,	I	will	argue,	this	first-personal	way	of	knowing	what	we	believe	is	privileged	in	the	sense	that	it	is	immune	from	the	rational	uncertainty	and	error	that	affects	our	ways	of	knowing	what	others	believe.2	What	is	this	first-personal	way	of	knowing	what	we	believe?	A	preliminary	answer	is	that	we	know	what	we	believe	by	introspection.	However,	the	term	‘introspection’	is	nothing	more	than	a	placeholder	for	an	account	of	how	we	know	what	we	believe.	We	certainly	cannot	assume	that	our	knowledge	of	what	we	believe	has	its	source	in	anything	like	inner	perception.	So	the	task	remains	for	a	theory	of	introspection	to	fill	in	this	placeholder	by	giving	an	informative	account	of	our	first-personal	way	of	knowing	what	we	believe.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	argue	that	what	I	call	the	simple	theory	of	
introspection	can	be	extended	to	account	for	our	introspective	knowledge	of	what	
																																																								1	See	Boghossian	1989:	67	for	a	statement	of	this	objection.	I	won’t	discuss	whether	the	Rylean	view	is	correctly	attributed	to	Ryle	himself,	but	see	his	1949:	Ch.	6.	2	I	borrow	the	terminology	of	peculiar	and	privileged	access	from	Byrne	2005:	80-2.	
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we	believe	as	well	as	what	we	experience.3	In	section	one,	I	present	the	simple	theory	of	introspection	and	motivate	the	extension	from	experience	to	belief.	In	section	two,	I	argue	that	extending	the	simple	theory	provides	a	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	by	explaining	why	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	always	involves	some	degree	of	irrationality.	In	section	three,	I	argue	that	it	also	solves	the	puzzle	of	transparency	by	explaining	why	it’s	rational	to	answer	the	question	whether	one	believes	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p.	Finally,	in	section	four,	I	defend	the	simple	theory	against	objections	by	arguing	that	self-knowledge	constitutes	an	ideal	of	rationality.		
1. The	Simple	Theory	of	Introspection	It	is	sometimes	assumed	that	our	knowledge	of	what	we	believe,	like	our	knowledge	of	what	others	believe,	must	be	based	upon	observation,	inference,	or	nothing	at	all.	Paul	Boghossian	(1989)	relies	on	this	assumption	to	generate	a	skeptical	paradox	by	arguing	that	none	of	these	options	can	explain	how	we	know	what	we	believe.	According	to	Boghossian,	an	adequate	response	to	the	skeptical	paradox	requires	showing	that	one	of	these	three	options	can	be	made	to	work	after	all.	But	a	more	promising	option	is	to	reject	the	starting	assumption	that	our	knowledge	of	what	we	believe	is	based	on	observation,	inference,	or	else	nothing	at	all.	This	is	the	option	taken	by	Christopher	Peacocke,	who	calls	it	“the	spurious	trilemma”	(1998:	83).	Peacocke	argues	that	you	can	know	that	you’re	in	a	conscious	state	by	forming	a	belief	on	the	basis	of	that	very	conscious	state.	This	is	what	he	calls	a	“consciously-based	self-ascription”.	For	example,	you	can	know	that	you’re	in	pain	by	believing	that	you’re	in	pain	on	the	basis	of	the	conscious	state	of	being	in	pain.	This	knowledge	is	not	based	on	observation	or	inference,	but	that	doesn’t	mean	that	it’s	not	based	on	reasons	at	all.	According	to	Peacocke,	merely	being	in	pain	gives	you	a	reason	to	believe	that	you’re	in	pain.	Thus,	he	writes,	“An	experience	of	pain	can	be	a	thinker’s	reason	for	judging	that	he	is	in	pain”	(1998:	72).																																																									3	I	first	introduced	the	simple	theory	of	introspection	in	Smithies	2012a,	but	see	also	Peacocke	1998,	Pryor	2005,	Zimmerman	2006,	Shoemaker	2009,	and	Neta	2011	for	closely	related	proposals.	
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The	simple	theory	of	introspection	extends	this	proposal.	It	says	that	you	know	by	means	of	introspection	that	you’re	in	some	mental	state	M	when	you	believe	that	you’re	in	M	on	the	basis	of	a	reason	that	is	constituted	by	the	fact	that	you’re	in	M.	On	this	view,	the	mere	fact	that	you’re	in	M	gives	you	a	reason	to	believe	that	you’re	in	M	and	thereby	puts	you	in	a	position	to	know	that	you’re	in	M.4	Introspection	provides	knowledge	of	negative	as	well	as	positive	facts	about	conscious	experience.	Just	as	I	can	know	by	introspection	that	I’m	in	pain	when	I	am,	so	I	can	know	by	introspection	that	I’m	not	in	pain	when	I’m	not.	Can	we	say	that	the	fact	that	I’m	not	in	pain	is	my	reason	for	believing	that	I’m	in	pain?	The	problem	is	that	my	laptop	is	not	in	pain,	but	it	doesn’t	thereby	have	a	reason	to	believe	that	it’s	not	in	pain.	We	can	say	instead	that	my	reason	for	believing	that	I’m	in	pain	is	the	fact	that	I’m	in	some	total	mental	state	that	includes	being	in	pain,	whereas	my	reason	to	believe	that	I’m	not	in	pain	is	the	fact	that	I’m	in	some	total	mental	state	that	excludes	being	in	pain.	My	laptop	doesn’t	satisfy	either	of	these	conditions.	In	general,	having	a	reason	to	believe	that	p	is	not	sufficient	for	being	in	a	position	to	know	that	p.	According	to	the	simple	theory,	however,	an	introspective	reason	for	believing	that	you	are	in	M	is	constituted	by	the	very	fact	you	are	in	M.	This	fact	is	self-intimating	in	the	sense	that	if	you’re	in	M,	then	you	thereby	have	an	introspective	reason	to	believe	that	you’re	in	M.	Moreover,	this	reason	is	infallible	in	the	sense	that	if	you	have	this	reason	to	believe	that	you’re	in	M,	then	it’s	true	that	you’re	in	M.	I	claim	that	this	reason	is	indefeasible	because	it	cannot	be	defeated	by	evidence	that	you	have	them	reason	when	it’s	false	that	you’re	in	M.	And	it	is	
immune	from	Gettier	cases	because	it	cannot	be	that	you	have	this	reason	when	it’s	accidentally	true	that	you’re	in	M.	The	upshot	is	that	having	an	introspective	reason	to	believe	that	you’re	in	a	mental	state	puts	you	in	a	position	to	know	by	means	of	introspection	that	you’re	in	that	mental	state.	Which	facts	about	our	mental	states	can	be	known	by	introspection?	We	cannot	know	all	of	our	mental	states	by	introspection.	Psychophysical	experiments																																																									4	Are	reasons	facts	or	mental	states?	I	say	that	reasons	are	constituted	by	facts	about	your	mental	states,	whereas	Peacocke	says	that	reasons	are	constituted	by	your	mental	states	themselves,	but	the	difference	will	not	be	crucial	here.	
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show	that	our	performance	on	word	completion	tasks	is	affected	by	unconscious	representations	of	masked	stimuli	–	for	instance,	subjects	primed	with	the	word	‘reason’	are	more	likely	to	complete	the	word	stem	‘rea-’	as	‘reason’	than	‘reader’.	We	can’t	know	by	introspection	that	we	represent	these	masked	stimuli,	since	these	mental	representations	are	unconscious.	We	know	about	them	only	on	the	basis	of	psychophysical	experiments,	and	not	on	the	basis	of	introspection.5	Plausibly,	we	can	know	our	conscious	experiences	by	means	of	introspection.	If	we	restrict	the	simple	theory	of	introspection	to	our	conscious	experiences,	then	we	are	committed	to	the	following	thesis:		
The	restricted	thesis:	for	any	conscious	experience	E,	one	has	an	introspective	reason	to	believe	that	one	has	E	if	and	only	if	one	has	E.		My	target	question	in	this	paper	is	whether	we	can	extend	the	simple	theory	from	conscious	experience	to	standing	belief	so	as	to	yield	the	thesis	below:			
The	extended	thesis:	for	any	proposition	p,	one	has	an	introspective	reason	to	believe	that	one	believes	that	p	if	and	only	if	one	believes	that	p.		In	this	section,	I’ll	briefly	sketch	three	arguments	for	extending	the	simple	theory	to	include	the	extended	thesis	as	well	as	the	restricted	thesis.	In	the	next	section,	I’ll	argue	that	the	extended	thesis	provides	a	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox.	First,	the	extended	thesis	explains	how	we	can	have	standing	knowledge	of	what	we	believe.6	We	have	standing	knowledge	about	many	things:	for	instance,	I	know	that	I	live	in	Columbus,	and	I	retain	this	knowledge	even	when	I’m	not	consciously	thinking	about	where	I	live.	We	also	have	standing	knowledge	about	our	beliefs:	for	instance,	I	know	that	I	believe	that	I	live	in	Columbus,	and	I	retain	this	knowledge	even	when	I’m	not	consciously	thinking	about	what	I	believe.	But	what																																																									5	See	Marcel	1983	and	Reingold	and	Merikle	1990	for	experimental	data	on	effects	of	masked	priming	in	unconscious	perception.	6	Compare	Zimmerman	2006:	357-61	and	Shoemaker	2009:	48-50.	
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explains	our	standing	knowledge	of	what	we	believe?	I	cannot	know	that	p	unless	I	have	some	reason	for	believing	that	p,	but	then	what	is	my	reason	for	believing	that	I	believe	that	I	live	in	Columbus?	The	problem	is	that	I	can	retain	my	knowledge	of	what	I	believe	even	when	there	is	nothing	in	the	stream	of	conscious	experience	that	bears	on	the	question	of	what	I	believe.	The	extended	thesis	solves	this	problem	because	my	standing	belief	that	I	live	in	Columbus	gives	me	a	standing	reason	for	believing	that	I	believe	that	I	live	in	Columbus.	When	my	standing	second-order	belief	is	properly	based	on	the	reason	provided	by	my	standing	first-order	belief,	then	it	constitutes	introspective	knowledge.7	Second,	the	extended	thesis	is	needed	for	explaining	access	internalism	in	epistemology.8	To	a	first	approximation,	access	internalism	is	the	thesis	that	one	is	always	in	a	position	to	know	which	propositions	it	is	rational	for	one	to	believe	by	means	of	introspection	and	a	priori	reflection	alone.	The	rationale	for	access	internalism	is	that	the	facts	about	which	propositions	it	is	rational	for	one	to	believe	at	any	given	time	are	determined	by	facts	about	one’s	mental	states	at	that	time.	Moreover,	one	is	always	in	a	position	to	know	these	facts	about	one’s	mental	states	through	introspection	when	they	are	relevant	in	determining	which	propositions	it	is	rational	for	one	to	believe.	But	facts	about	one’s	beliefs,	as	well	as	facts	about	one’s	conscious	experiences,	are	relevant	in	determining	which	propositions	it	is	rational	for	one	to	believe.	Therefore,	explaining	access	internalism	requires	assuming	that	one	is	always	in	a	position	to	know	all	the	facts	about	which	beliefs	one	has,	as	well	as	which	conscious	experiences	one	has,	at	any	given	time.	Third,	the	extended	thesis	explains	a	plausible	connection	between	rationality	and	self-knowledge.	On	the	one	hand,	the	new	evil	demon	problem	for	externalist	theories	of	rationality	relies	on	the	intuition	that	a	Cartesian	demon	can	deceive	me	about	the	external	world	without	thereby	impugning	my	rationality.	On	the	other	hand,	the	isolation	problem	for	coherentist	theories	of	rationality	relies	on																																																									7	Note	that	introspective	knowledge	need	not	be	based	on	any	conscious	activity	of	“introspecting”	either	in	the	present	or	at	any	past	time.	8	See	BonJour	1985	for	a	classic	defense	of	access	internalism.	I	argue	for	access	internalism	and	respond	to	objections	in	Smithies	2012b,	2015a,	and	forthcoming.	
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the	intuition	that	a	Cartesian	demon	cannot	deceive	me	about	my	own	beliefs	and	experiences	without	thereby	impugning	my	rationality.	Combining	these	two	intuitions	reveals	an	important	asymmetry	in	our	concept	of	rationality.	Rationality	requires	knowledge	of	the	internal	world,	but	not	the	external	world.9	In	effect,	my	goal	in	what	follows	is	to	bolster	this	third	argument	by	using	Moore’s	paradox	to	support	the	connection	between	rationality	and	self-knowledge	in	the	special	case	of	belief.	The	key	idea	is	that	failing	to	know	what	you	believe	results	in	a	Moorean	predicament	that	seems	quite	irrational.	If	we	assume	that	rationality	requires	self-knowledge,	then	we	can	explain	why	this	kind	of	Moorean	predicament	is	as	irrational	as	it	seems.		
2. Moore’s	Paradox	G.	E.	Moore	observed	that	there	is	something	patently	“absurd”	–	one	might	even	say	“Mooronic”	(Koethe	1978)	–	involved	in	asserting	sentences	such	as	the	following:		 (1) I	went	to	the	pictures	last	Tuesday	but	I	don’t	believe	that	I	did.	(1942:	543)	(2) I	believe	that	he	has	gone	out,	but	he	has	not.	(1944:	204)		Indeed,	Moore’s	observation	seems	applicable	to	any	assertion	of	a	sentence	that	has	one	of	the	following	syntactic	forms:		 (3) p,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	(The	omissive	form.)	(4) I	believe	that	p,	but	it’s	not	the	case	that	p.	(The	commissive	form.)		The	problem	of	explaining	why	it’s	absurd	to	assert	Moorean	sentences	of	these	forms	has	become	known	as	Moore’s	paradox.10																																																									9	See	Cohen	1984	for	the	new	evil	demon	problem	and	Sosa	1991:	136	for	the	isolation	problem.	Silins	(forthcoming)	argues	that	the	new	evil	demon	problem	arises	for	the	internal	world	too.	I	plan	to	address	his	argument	elsewhere.	10	The	paradox	was	named	by	Wittgenstein	1953:	190.	Moore	mentions	the	paradox	in	his	1942:	540-3	and	1944:	204,	but	his	most	detailed	discussion	is	in	Moore	1993.	See	Green	and	Williams	2007	for	a	historical	introduction	to	Moore’s	paradox.	
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There	is	a	paradox	here	because	asserting	Moorean	sentences	seems	absurd	or	self-defeating	in	much	the	same	way	as	asserting	a	contradiction,	and	yet	Moorean	assertions	are	not	contradictions;	after	all,	they	can	be	true.	Since	I	am	neither	omniscient	nor	infallible,	it	can	be	true	that	p	when	I	don’t	believe	that	p	and	it	can	be	false	that	p	when	I	believe	that	p.	But	although	Moorean	sentences	can	be	true,	they	cannot	be	asserted	without	absurdity.	Moore’s	paradox	is	the	problem	of	explaining	why	this	is	so.	As	Moore	says,	“It	is	a	paradox	that	it	should	be	perfectly	absurd	to	utter	assertively	words	of	which	the	meaning	is	something	which	may	well	be	true	–	is	not	a	contradiction”	(1993:	209).		
2.1. Linguistic	Solutions	Since	Moore,	it	has	been	widely	noted	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	absurd	in	much	the	same	way	as	asserting	them.	Moreover,	it	is	absurd	to	believe	Moorean	conjunctions	whether	or	not	one	gives	linguistic	expression	to	one’s	belief	in	the	speech	act	of	assertion.	If	Moore’s	paradox	is	not	a	purely	linguistic	phenomenon,	then	it	cannot	be	given	a	purely	linguistic	solution.	This	undermines	many	of	the	earliest	solutions	to	Moore’s	paradox,	including	those	originally	proposed	by	Moore	and	Wittgenstein.	Moore	claims	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	one	contradicts	oneself	by	asserting	a	conjunction	of	the	omissive	form.	In	asserting	that	p,	one	“implies”	that	one	believes	that	p,	and	so	in	asserting	that	one	does	not	believe	that	p,	one	thereby	contradicts	what	one	has	implied.	Of	course,	there	is	no	logical	implication	from	the	assertion	that	p	to	the	conclusion	that	one	believes	that	p.	Moore’s	claim	is	rather	that	asserting	that	p	reliably	indicates	that	one	believes	that	p.	On	a	Gricean	account,	asserting	that	p	functions	to	express	that	one	believes	that	p	because	assertion	is	a	speech	act	that	is	performed	with	the	intention	of	causing	one’s	audience	to	believe	that	one	believes	that	p.	So,	following	Moore,	one	might	hold	that	there	is	a	contradiction	between	the	content	that	is	asserted	and	the	content	that	is	expressed	in	the	act	of	making	the	assertion.11																																																									11	See	Baldwin	1990:	228	and	Rosenthal	1995	for	neo-Moorean	solutions.	
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In	contrast,	Wittgenstein	claims	that	in	asserting	that	I	believe	that	p,	I	thereby	assert	that	p.12	On	this	view,	one	asserts	a	contradiction	by	asserting	a	conjunction	of	the	commissive	form.	Inspired	by	Wittgenstein,	Jane	Heal	(1994)	claims	that	asserting	that	I	believe	that	p	functions	to	express	and	not	merely	to	
report	the	belief	that	p.	On	this	view,	I	contradict	myself	by	asserting	a	conjunction	of	the	commissive	form	insofar	as	the	belief	that	I	express	in	reporting	that	I	believe	that	p	contradicts	the	belief	that	I	express	in	asserting	that	p.	There	are	problems	for	both	Moorean	and	Wittgensteinian	solutions	to	the	paradox.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Moorean	solution	cannot	easily	be	extended	from	the	omissive	form	to	the	commissive	form.	Does	asserting	that	p	express	not	only	that	I	believe	that	p,	but	also	that	I	don’t	believe	its	negation?	On	the	other	hand,	the	Wittgensteinian	solution	cannot	easily	be	extended	from	the	commissive	form	to	the	omissive	form.	Does	asserting	that	I	don’t	believe	that	p	express	that	I	believe	its	negation?	A	more	serious	problem	for	both	accounts	is	that	it’s	not	clear	how	to	extend	either	of	them	from	Moorean	assertion	to	Moorean	belief.	What’s	wrong	with	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	without	asserting	them?	A	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	should	not	only	generalize	from	assertion	to	belief,	but	it	should	also	explain	the	absurdity	of	Moorean	assertions	in	terms	of	the	absurdity	of	the	Moorean	beliefs	that	they	express.	There	is	nothing	wrong	with	uttering	Moorean	sentences	in	performing	speech	acts	that	don’t	express	Moorean	beliefs	–	for	instance,	in	making	a	joke	or	a	philosophical	point.	Wittgenstein	gives	the	example	of	a	railway	employee	who	concludes	his	announcement	of	the	schedule	with	the	skeptical	disclaimer,	“Personally,	I	don’t	believe	it”	(1980:	84).	There	is	no	absurdity	here	because	the	announcement	doesn’t	function	to	express	what	the	speaker	believes.	The	same	applies	to	Andre	Gallois’	example	of	an	eliminativist	about	belief,	who	says,	“Neurophysiology	is	the	key	to	understanding	the	mind,	but	I	do	not	believe	that	it	is”	(1996:	52).	Her	speech	act	doesn’t	function	to	express	what	she	believes,	since	it	is	not	performed	with	the	intention	of	causing	
																																																								12	See	Wittgenstein	1953:	190-2	and	1980:	90-6.	
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her	audience	to	believe	that	she	believes	what	she	is	saying.	Indeed,	the	speech	act	is	intended	to	have	precisely	the	opposite	effect.	If	assertion	is	defined	narrowly	as	a	speech	act	that	functions	to	express	belief,	then	all	Moorean	assertions	are	absurd,	but	not	all	utterances	of	Moorean	sentences	are	assertions.	If	assertion	is	defined	more	broadly,	then	Moorean	assertions	are	absurd	only	when	they	have	this	function.	Either	way,	the	absurdity	of	Moorean	assertions	can	be	derived	exclusively	from	the	absurdity	of	the	Moorean	beliefs	that	they	express.	As	Sydney	Shoemaker	writes,	“An	explanation	of	why	one	cannot	(coherently)	assert	a	Moore-paradoxical	sentence	will	come	along	for	free,	via	the	principle	that	what	can	be	(coherently)	believed	constrains	what	can	be	(coherently)	asserted”	(1996:	76).		
2.2. Psychological	and	Epistemological	Solutions	What	is	wrong	with	believing	Moorean	conjunctions?	We	can	draw	a	distinction	between	psychological	solutions,	which	claim	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	psychologically	impossible,	and	epistemological	solutions,	which	claim	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	epistemically	irrational.	I’ll	begin	with	some	reasons	for	skepticism	about	the	prospects	for	a	psychological	solution	before	exploring	the	options	for	an	epistemological	solution	in	more	detail.13	First,	it’s	not	clear	that	there	is	any	proposition	so	absurd	that	believing	it	is	beyond	the	realm	of	human	possibility.	Some	human	beings	believe	some	very	strange	things,	especially	those	who	reside	in	psychiatric	hospitals	and	philosophy	departments.	Patients	with	Cotard’s	syndrome	believe	they	are	dead.	Eliminativists	believe	they	have	no	beliefs.	Dialetheists	believe	that	some	contradictions	are	true.	It’s	not	at	all	clear	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	humanly	impossible.14																																																									13	See	Hintikka	1962:	67	and	Shoemaker	1996:	85-6	for	the	claim	that	it’s	impossible	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	14	Are	eliminativists	and	dialetheists	irrational?	Surely	not	in	the	same	sense	as	delusional	patients.	I	claim	that	they	are	rational	by	non-ideal	standards,	although	Moorean	incoherence	and	logical	incoherence	always	constitutes	some	departure	from	ideal	rationality.	See	section	4	for	more	on	the	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality.	
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Second,	it’s	not	clear	how	to	motivate	the	claim	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	humanly	impossible.	Some	philosophers	have	argued	that	there	are	rationality	constraints	that	impose	limits	on	how	much	irrationality	is	consistent	with	having	beliefs	at	all.15	One	might	argue	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	impossible	on	the	grounds	that	it	violates	these	rationality	constraints.	But	this	is	a	risky	argument,	since	we	know	from	empirical	studies	of	human	reasoning	that	any	plausible	rationality	constraints	must	be	weak	enough	to	allow	for	a	considerable	degree	of	human	irrationality.16	As	a	result,	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	may	be	humanly	possible	even	if	it	always	involves	some	degree	of	irrationality.	Third,	it’s	humanly	possible	to	believe	the	conjuncts	of	a	Moorean	conjunction	without	conjoining	them,	but	it’s	not	rational,	so	an	epistemological	puzzle	remains.	Generally	speaking,	if	it’s	rational	to	believe	that	p,	and	it’s	rational	to	believe	that	q,	then	it’s	also	rational	to	believe	the	conjunction	that	p	and	q.17	So	if	it’s	irrational	to	believe	a	Moorean	conjunction,	then	it’s	irrational	to	believe	the	conjuncts	of	a	Moorean	conjunction.	Believing	a	Moorean	conjunction	is	more	egregiously	irrational	than	believing	the	conjuncts	of	a	Moorean	conjunction,	but	neither	is	fully	rational.	In	much	the	same	way,	believing	an	explicit	contradiction	is	more	egregiously	irrational	than	believing	contradictory	propositions,	but	neither	is	fully	rational.	Our	rational	failings	are	sometimes	excusable	given	our	psychological	limitations,	but	we	cannot	avoid	rational	criticism	just	by	failing	to	conjoin	our	beliefs.	We	need	an	epistemological	solution	to	explain	this.	Finally,	Roy	Sorensen	notes	that	there	are	Moorean	sentences	that	have	neither	omissive	nor	commissive	forms,	although	they	entail	sentences	with	omissive	or	commissive	forms.	For	instance,	each	of	(5)	and	(6)	entails	(7):		 (5) God	knows	that	we	are	atheists.	(1988:	17)																																																									15	See	Davidson	1973	and	Lewis	1974.	16	See	Kahneman	2011	for	a	survey	of	empirical	work	on	human	reasoning.	17	Multi-premise	closure	is	controversial	because	the	probability	of	a	conjunction	can	be	less	than	each	of	its	conjuncts	when	they’re	not	certain.	But	we	need	only	a	weakened	version	that	applies	in	cases	where	the	probability	of	the	conjunction	does	not	fall	below	the	minimum	threshold	for	rational	belief.	
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(6) The	atheism	of	my	mother’s	nieceless	brother’s	only	nephew	angers	God.	(1988:	28)	(7) God	exists,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	God	exists.		In	some	cases,	the	entailments	are	more	complex	than	others.	If	one	fails	to	recognize	these	entailments,	then	one	can	have	beliefs	that	entail	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions.	Given	our	psychological	limitations,	these	beliefs	are	more	egregiously	irrational	when	the	entailments	are	more	obvious	and	less	so	when	they	are	more	complicated.	But	again,	while	our	psychological	limitations	can	excuse	our	rational	failings,	they	do	not	absolve	us	from	rational	criticism	altogether.	An	epistemological	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	should	explain	why	there	is	always	some	irrationality	–	that	is,	some	failure	of	epistemic	rationality	–	associated	with	believing	anything	that	entails	a	Moorean	conjunction.	I’ll	argue	that	it’s	always	irrational	to	believe	Moorean	conjunctions	of	the	omissive	form,	although	it’s	sometimes	rational	to	believe	Moorean	conjunctions	of	the	commissive	form,	but	only	when	one	has	inconsistent	beliefs.	I’ll	begin	with	the	omissive	form	and	I’ll	revisit	the	commissive	form	in	due	course.		
2.3. Moorean	Belief	is	Self-Falsifying	John	Williams	(1994:	165)	argues	that	it’s	always	irrational	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p,	because	it	is	self-falsifying	in	the	sense	that	believing	the	conjunction	makes	it	false.	If	I	believe	the	conjunction,	then	I	believe	both	conjuncts,	but	believing	the	first	conjunct	makes	the	second	conjunct	false.	As	a	result,	the	whole	conjunction	is	false	whenever	I	believe	it.18	Claudio	de	Almeida	(2001:	41)	rejects	Williams’	proposal	on	the	grounds	that	one	can	rationally	believe	necessary	falsehoods.	His	example	is	believing	the	negation	of	the	Lowenheim-Skolem	theorem	on	the	basis	of	misleading	testimony	from	experts	in	logic.	This	example	is	controversial,	since	it	turns	on	a	disputed	question	about	whether	full	rationality	requires	omniscience	and	infallibility	about																																																									18	Here,	and	elsewhere,	I’ll	assume	the	principle	that	belief	distributes	over	conjunction,	but	not	the	principle	that	belief	collects	over	conjunction.	
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a	priori	truths	of	logic.	But	we	can	give	less	controversial	examples:	for	instance,	it	can	be	rational	to	believe	the	negations	of	Kripkean	a	posteriori	necessary	truths	–Hesperus	is	distinct	from	Phosphorus,	water	is	not	composed	of	H2O,	and	so	on.	In	defense	of	Williams,	however,	these	propositions	are	not	self-falsifying.	They	are	necessarily	false,	and	so	false	whenever	believed,	but	believing	them	doesn’t	make	them	false,	since	they	are	false	whether	or	not	they	are	believed.	So	the	challenge	remains	to	give	a	more	convincing	counterexample	to	the	thesis	that	all	self-falsifying	beliefs	are	irrational.	As	I’ll	explain,	Moore	himself	provides	the	materials	we	need	for	constructing	a	counterexample.	Moore	(1993:	208)	uses	the	following	pair	of	sentences	to	illustrate	an	epistemic	asymmetry	between	first-person	and	third-person	perspectives:		 (8) I	don’t	believe	it’s	raining,	but	as	a	matter	of	fact	it	is.	(9) Moore	doesn’t	believe	it’s	raining,	but	as	a	matter	of	fact	it	is.		As	Moore	notes,	it’s	absurd	for	him	to	assert	(8),	but	it’s	not	absurd	for	someone	else	to	assert	(9)	in	making	reference	to	Moore.	Similarly,	it	needn’t	be	absurd	for	Moore	himself	to	assert	(9)	in	making	reference	to	himself,	so	long	as	he	is	suffering	from	amnesia	or	otherwise	rationally	ignorant	of	his	own	identity.	In	that	case,	Moore	can	rationally	believe	(9),	despite	the	fact	that	in	believing	it,	he	thereby	makes	it	false.	This	shows	that	not	all	self-falsifying	beliefs	are	irrational.19	Moorean	belief	is	irrational	not	merely	because	it’s	self-falsifying	but	because	I	can	know	that	it’s	self-falsifying.	After	all,	I	can’t	rationally	believe	what	I	know	to	be	false.	But	knowing	that	a	proposition	is	self-falsifying	doesn’t	enable	me	to	know	that	it’s	false	unless	I	also	know	that	I	believe	it.	What	makes	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	irrational	is	the	fact	that	I	can	know,	or	rationally	believe,	the	premises	of	the	following	argument:		
																																																								19	Just	as	not	all	self-falsifying	beliefs	are	irrational,	so	not	all	self-verifying	beliefs	are	rational.	See	Pryor	2006	for	examples	and	discussion.	
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(1) Anyone	who	believes	that	p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p	thereby	believes	something	false.	(2) I	believe	that	p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	(3) Therefore,	it	is	false	that	p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p.		So	it	seems	that	we	can’t	explain	why	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	irrational	without	assuming	that	we	can	know	what	we	believe.	This	is	our	first	hint	that	the	connection	between	rationality	and	self-knowledge	is	the	key	to	solving	Moore’s	paradox.		
2.4. The	Knowledge	Rule	Timothy	Williamson	argues	that	believing	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	is	irrational	because	they	cannot	be	known	(2000:	253-4).	Knowing	that	p	requires	truly	believing	that	p,	but	you	can’t	truly	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	since	believing	the	conjunction	makes	it	false.	It	follows	that	you	can’t	know	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	How	do	we	get	from	the	premise	that	you	can’t	know	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	to	the	conclusion	that	you	can’t	rationally	believe	it?	Williamson	bridges	the	gap	in	the	argument	by	proposing	the	knowledge	rule	for	belief:		
The	knowledge	rule:	one	should	believe	p	only	if	one	knows	p.	(2000:	255-6)		If	we	interpret	the	knowledge	rule	in	terms	of	the	‘should’	of	rationality,	then	it	implies	that	one	rationally	believes	that	p	only	if	one	knows	that	p.	Since	I	cannot	know	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	to	be	true,	it	follows	that	I	cannot	rationally	believe	them	either.	Like	many	others,	I	reject	the	knowledge	rule	on	the	grounds	that	one	can	rationally	believe	that	p	without	knowing	that	p	in	deception	cases	in	which	it’s	false	that	p	or	Gettier	cases	in	which	it’s	accidentally	true	that	p.	But	if	that	is	right,	then	why	can’t	I	rationally	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	without	knowing	it?	
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There	is	an	important	difference	between	these	cases.	We	can	put	the	point	in	terms	of	Jonathan	Sutton’s	(2007:	8-14)	distinction	between	“known	unknowns”	and	“unknown	unknowns”.	It	can	be	rational	to	believe	that	p	in	deception	cases	and	Gettier	cases	so	long	as	one	cannot	know	that	one	cannot	know	that	p.	These	are	unknown	unknowns.	In	contrast,	one	can	know	on	the	basis	of	Williamson’s	argument	that	one	cannot	know	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions.	These	are	known	unknowns.	So	the	question	arises	whether	it	can	be	rational	to	believe	that	p	while	knowing	that	one	cannot	know	that	p.20	Can	it	be	rational	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	while	knowing	that	I	cannot	know	it?	Since	I	can	know	that	it’s	self-falsifying	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	I	can	know	that	either	it’s	false	or	I	don’t	believe	it.	Now,	if	I	can	know	which	of	these	disjuncts	is	true,	then	I	can	argue	as	follows:		 (1) Either	I	can	know	that	it’s	false	or	I	can	know	that	I	don’t	believe	it.	(2) If	I	can	know	that	it’s	false,	then	I	can’t	rationally	believe	it,	since	I	can’t	rationally	believe	what	I	can	know	to	be	false.		(3) If	I	can	know	that	I	don’t	believe	it,	then	I	can’t	rationally	believe	it,	since	I	can’t	rationally	believe	what	I	don’t	believe	at	all.	(4) Either	way,	I	can’t	rationally	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.		The	problem	is	that	knowledge	of	a	disjunction	doesn’t	entail	knowledge	of	either	disjunct.	In	the	case	at	hand,	I	can’t	know	which	disjunct	is	true	unless	I	know	whether	or	not	I	believe	the	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	But	if	I	can’t	know	this,	then	the	first	premise	is	false:	I	can	know	that	either	the	conjunction	is	false	or	I	don’t	believe	it,	but	I	can’t	know	which	of	these	disjuncts	is	true.	If	I	believe	the																																																									20	Smithies	(forthcoming)	argues	for	an	RK	thesis,	which	states	that	it’s	rational	for	one	to	believe	that	p	only	if	it’s	rational	for	one	to	believe	that	one	is	in	an	epistemic	position	to	know	that	p.	The	RK	thesis	doesn’t	undercut	the	rationality	of	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	since	it	can	be	rational	to	believe	you’re	in	an	epistemic	position	to	know	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	even	if	you	know	that	you	cannot	convert	this	epistemic	position	into	knowledge	because	your	evidence	is	finkish.	See	section	2.6	below	for	more	on	finkish	evidence.	
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conjunction,	then	it’s	false,	but	if	I	can’t	know	that	I	believe	it,	then	I	can’t	know	that	it	is	false,	and	so	there’s	no	obstacle	to	the	rationality	of	believing	it.	Once	again,	the	key	to	solving	Moore’s	paradox	is	the	connection	between	rationality	and	self-knowledge:	we	need	to	assume	that	rationality	requires	knowing	what	you	believe	in	order	to	explain	the	irrationality	of	believing	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions.	Sydney	Shoemaker	has	done	more	than	anyone	to	argue	for	this	connection	between	rationality	and	self-knowledge,	so	I	turn	to	his	view	next.21		
2.5. The	Rational	Self-Intimation	Thesis	Sydney	Shoemaker	(1996:	76)	notes	that	one	cannot	self-consciously	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	without	thereby	having	contradictory	beliefs.22	We	can	define	a	self-conscious	belief	as	a	belief	that	one	believes	oneself	to	have;	that	is,	one	self-consciously	believes	that	p	just	in	case	one	believes	that	p	while	also	believing	that	one	believes	that	p.	If	I	self-consciously	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	of	the	form,	p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p,	then	I	believe	that	I	believe	that	
p	while	also	believing	that	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	Assuming	that	rationality	precludes	having	contradictory	beliefs,	it	follows	that	there’s	always	some	degree	of	irrationality	involved	in	self-consciously	believing	a	Moorean	conjunction.	The	appeal	to	self-consciousness	cannot	explain	the	irrationality	of	all	Moorean	beliefs	unless	we	assume	that	all	beliefs	are	self-conscious.	On	this	view,	it’s	impossible	to	believe	that	p	without	also	believing	that	one	believes	that	p.	This	is	captured	by	the	following	self-intimation	thesis:		
The	self-intimation	thesis:	necessarily,	if	one	believes	that	p,	then	one	believes	that	one	believes	that	p.		
																																																								21	See	Shoemaker	1996:	Ch.	4	on	Moore’s	paradox.	Shoemaker	gives	additional	arguments	for	the	rational	self-intimation	thesis	in	his	1996:	Ch.	2	&	11.	These	arguments	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	see	Kind	2003,	Siewert	2003,	and	Byrne	2005:	89-92	for	critical	discussion.	22	See	also	Baldwin	1990:	230	and	Kriegel	2004	for	this	argument.	
	 16	
However,	the	self-intimation	thesis	is	false.	First,	non-human	animals	and	human	infants	can	have	beliefs	without	possessing	the	concept	of	belief.	And	second,	human	adults	who	possess	the	concept	of	belief	can	have	beliefs	without	having	an	infinite	hierarchy	of	higher-order	beliefs	of	infinitely	increasing	complexity.	To	avoid	these	problems,	we	need	to	modify	the	self-intimation	thesis	as	follows:		
The	modified	self-intimation	thesis:	necessarily,	if	one	believes	that	p,	and	one	has	some	doxastic	attitude	towards	the	proposition	that	one	believes	that	p,	then	one	believes	that	one	believes	that	p.		But	even	the	modified	self-intimation	thesis	is	falsified	by	cases	of	compromised	rationality	–	such	as	repression	or	self-deception	–	in	which	one	believes	that	p	while	disbelieving	or	withholding	belief	that	one	believes	that	p.	If	we	now	modify	the	self-intimation	thesis	by	adding	a	rationality	condition,	as	Shoemaker	does,	then	we	arrive	at	the	rational	self-intimation	thesis	below:		
The	rational	self-intimation	thesis:	necessarily,	if	one	is	rational,	and	one	believes	that	p,	and	one	has	some	doxastic	attitude	towards	the	proposition	that	one	believes	that	p,	then	one	believes	that	one	believes	that	p.		On	this	view,	it’s	always	irrational	to	believe	that	p	while	disbelieving	or	withholding	belief	that	one	believes	that	p.	In	support	of	this	claim,	Shoemaker	(1996:	78)	notes	that	the	following	conversation	seems	absurd:		 A:	Is	it	raining?		B:	Yes.	A:	Do	you	believe	that	it’s	raining?	B:	No.	(Or:	I	don’t	know.)		Presumably,	what	explains	the	absurdity	of	this	exchange	is	that	believing	that	p	rationally	commits	one	to	believing	that	one	believes	that	p.	As	Shoemaker	puts	the	
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point,	“if	one	believes	something,	and	considers	whether	one	does,	one	must,	on	pain	of	irrationality,	believe	that	one	believes	it”	(1996:	77).	According	to	Shoemaker,	the	rational	commitment	to	believe	self-consciously,	together	with	the	rational	commitment	to	avoid	contradictory	beliefs,	implies	a	rational	commitment	to	avoid	believing	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions.	If	I	believe	that	p,	then	I’m	rationally	committed	to	believing	that	I	believe	that	p,	and	hence	to	refrain	from	believing	that	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	But	if	I	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	then	I	violate	one	or	other	of	these	rational	commitments.		
2.6. A	Puzzle	about	Finkish	Evidence	If	the	rational	self-intimation	thesis	is	true,	then	believing	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	is	always	irrational.	But	this	gives	rise	to	a	puzzle.	Why	does	rationality	require	that	if	I	believe	that	p,	then	I	believe	that	I	believe	that	p?	The	puzzle	arises	from	the	fact	that	my	total	evidence	can	make	it	rational	to	believe	p	while	also	making	it	rational	to	believe	I	don’t	believe	p.	For	instance,	I	might	have	meteorological	evidence	that	it	will	rain,	while	also	having	psychological	evidence	that	I	don’t	believe	it	will	rain.	In	that	case,	my	total	evidence	makes	it	rational	to	believe	the	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	“It	will	rain,	but	I	don’t	believe	it	will	rain”.	But	if	my	evidence	makes	it	rational	to	believe	the	Moorean	conjunction,	then	why	does	rationality	require	me	to	refrain	from	believing	it?	Shoemaker	(1996:	42-3)	argues	that	one	cannot	have	evidence	for	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	Suppose	my	meteorological	evidence	that	it	will	rain	consists	in	the	fact	that	the	forecast	says	it	will	rain.	Shoemaker	argues	that	this	is	part	of	my	evidence	only	if	I	believe	it,	in	which	case	the	fact	that	I	believe	it	is	part	of	my	psychological	evidence.	In	that	case	my	psychological	evidence	makes	it	rational	to	believe	that	I	believe	it	will	rain,	since	I’m	likely	to	believe	it	will	rain	when	I	believe	the	forecast	says	it	will	rain.	In	response	to	Shoemaker,	however,	I	might	have	background	evidence	that	I’m	irrational	and	so	unlikely	to	believe	it	will	rain	even	if	the	forecast	says	it	will	rain.	In	that	case,	my	total	evidence	makes	it	rational	to	believe	the	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	So	the	puzzle	remains.	
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This	puzzle	relies	on	an	assumption	of	evidentialism,	defined	as	the	thesis	that	one’s	evidence	determines	which	propositions	it	is	rational	for	one	to	believe.	If	we	reject	this	assumption,	then	we	can	dissolve	the	puzzle	by	allowing	for	rational	dilemmas	in	which	one	is	rationally	required	to	refrain	from	believing	propositions	that	are	supported	by	the	evidence.23	In	my	view,	however,	this	is	a	last	resort.	Other	things	equal,	we	should	prefer	a	simpler,	more	unified	theory	that	explains	the	requirements	of	rationality	in	terms	of	facts	about	what	the	evidence	supports.	The	challenge	that	remains	is	to	defend	evidentialism	by	solving	the	puzzle.	The	key	to	solving	the	puzzle	is	to	draw	a	distinction	between	propositional	and	doxastic	senses	of	rationality.24	Within	the	framework	of	evidentialism,	this	is	the	distinction	between	having	evidence	that	makes	it	rational	for	one	to	believe	a	proposition	and	believing	the	proposition	in	a	way	that	is	properly	based	on	the	evidence.	The	puzzle	arises	because	one	can	have	evidence	that	makes	it	rational	for	one	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	although	one	cannot	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	in	a	way	that	is	properly	based	on	the	evidence.	But	the	apparent	conflict	can	be	resolved	if	we	allow	that	the	evidence	in	question	is	“finkish”	in	the	sense	that	it	is	destroyed	or	undermined	in	the	process	of	attempting	to	form	a	doxastically	rational	belief	that	is	properly	based	on	the	evidence.25	The	simple	theory	implies	that	evidence	for	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	finkish	in	just	this	sense.	After	all,	believing	that	p	has	the	effect	of	destroying	the	evidence	that	makes	it	rational	to	believe	that	one	does	not	believe	that	p.	On	the	simple	theory,	psychological	evidence	about	what	one	believes	is	constituted	by	the	facts	about	what	one	believes.	So	one	can	have	meteorological	evidence	that	will	rain,	while	also	having	psychological	evidence	that	one	doesn’t	believe	that	it	will	rain,	so	long	as	one	doesn’t	believe	that	it	will	rain.	But	if	one	now	comes	to	believe	that	it	will	rain	on	the	basis	of	the	meteorological	evidence,	then																																																									23	See	Worsnip	2015	for	a	view	of	this	kind.	24	See	Firth	1978.	The	distinction	can	be	drawn	either	in	terms	of	rationality	or	justification.	I’ll	use	these	terms	interchangeably.	25	The	allusion	is	to	Martin’s	1994	finkish	dispositions,	which	are	destroyed	whenever	their	manifestation	conditions	obtain.	I	introduced	the	notion	of	finkish	evidence	in	Smithies	2012b:	288.	
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one’s	psychological	evidence	changes:	one	loses	one’s	earlier	psychological	evidence	that	one	does	not	believe	it	will	rain	and	acquires	new	psychological	evidence	that	one	believes	it	will	rain.	Therefore,	one’s	evidence	for	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	always	finkish.26	On	the	simple	theory,	believing	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	is	sometimes	propositionally	rational,	although	it	is	never	doxastically	rational.	One	important	consequence	is	that	this	undermines	attempts	to	define	the	propositional	sense	of	rationality	(or	justification)	in	terms	of	its	doxastic	cousin.	For	instance,	John	Turri	proposes	the	following	necessary	condition	for	propositional	justification:		 Necessarily,	for	all	S,	p,	and	t,	if	p	is	propositionally	justified	for	S	at	t,	then	p	is	propositionally	justified	for	S	at	t	because	S	currently	possesses	at	least	one	means	of	coming	to	believe	p	such	that,	were	S	to	believe	p	in	one	of	those	ways,	S’s	belief	would	thereby	be	doxastically	justified.	(2010:	320)		Omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	provide	a	counterexample.	As	we	have	seen,	one	can	have	evidence	that	propositionally	justifies	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	However,	it’s	not	true	that	one	has	the	means	for	coming	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	in	a	way	that	is	doxastically	justified.	How	should	we	understand	the	connection	between	propositional	and	doxastic	justification	within	an	evidentialist	framework?	A	standard	view	is	that	doxastic	justification	is	propositional	justification	plus	proper	basing:		 Necessarily,	for	all	S,	p,	and	t,	S’s	belief	that	p	is	doxastically	justified	at	t	if	and	only	if	at	t,	S	has	some	evidence	e	that	makes	it	the	case	that	p	is	propositionally	justified	for	S,	and	S	believes	that	p	in	a	way	that	is	properly	based	on	evidence	e.																																																									26	De	Almeida	notes	that	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	“epistemically	self-defeating”	in	the	sense	that	“belief	in	the	conjunction	necessarily	furnishes	me	with	a	reason	to	disbelieve	the	right-hand-side	of	the	conjunction”	(2001:	51-2).	But	he	goes	too	far	in	claiming	that	“a	Moore-paradoxical	proposition	is	one	for	which	the	believer	can	have	no	non-over-ridden	evidence”	(2001:	44).	
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	There	is	no	commitment	here	to	the	claim	that	doxastic	justification	can	be	reductively	defined	in	terms	of	propositional	justification	plus	proper	basing.	In	fact,	I	suspect	that	no	such	reductive	definition	is	immune	from	counterexamples.27	Instead,	we	can	define	proper	basing	non-reductively	as	the	relation	that	converts	propositional	justification	into	doxastic	justification.	Since	evidence	for	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	always	finkish,	one	cannot	satisfy	the	proper	basing	relation	that	converts	propositional	justification	into	doxastic	justification.	However,	it	does	not	follow	–	as	Turri’s	proposal	implies	–	that	it	cannot	be	propositionally	rational	to	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.		
2.7. The	Rational	Infallibility	Thesis	It	is	sometimes	assumed	that	a	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	should	give	a	unified	treatment	of	omissive	and	commissive	forms.28	As	I’ll	explain,	however,	there	are	logical	differences	between	them	that	call	for	differential	treatment.	I’ve	argued	that	believing	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	is	always	irrational.	In	contrast,	I’ll	argue	that	believing	commissive	Moorean	conjunctions	is	sometimes	rational,	but	only	when	one	has	contradictory	beliefs.	Assuming	that	rationality	precludes	having	contradictory	beliefs,	it	follows	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	is	always	either	irrational	or	involves	some	associated	irrationality.	Whereas	omissive	Moorean	conjunctions	are	self-falsifying,	commissive	Moorean	conjunctions	are	not.	They	can	be	truly	believed	when,	and	only	when,	one	has	contradictory	beliefs.	Indeed,	one	can	know	that	a	commissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	true	when	one	has	contradictory	beliefs.	Suppose	I	know	on	the	basis	of	good	evidence	that	I’m	a	bad	driver:	my	past	is	littered	with	wreckage.	At	the	same	time,	I	know	that	I	can’t	shake	the	belief	that	I’m	a	good	driver.	In	that	case,	I	know	a	Moorean	conjunction	of	the	commissive	form,	“I	believe	I’m	a	good	driver,																																																									27	Turri	2010	gives	counterexamples	to	the	analysis	of	doxastic	justification	as	propositional	justification	plus	basing,	but	his	examples	don’t	involve	proper	basing.	I	have	more	to	say	about	the	proper	basing	relation	in	Smithies	2015b.	28	See,	for	example,	Green	and	Williams	2007.	
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but	I’m	not”.	Since	rational	belief	is	required	for	knowledge,	it	follows	that	I	can	rationally	believe	this	Moorean	conjunction	too.29	It	might	be	objected	that	one	cannot	rationally	believe	a	proposition	while	also	believing	its	negation.	On	this	view,	rational	belief	requires	a	kind	of	internal	coherence	that	precludes	conflicting	beliefs.	But	this	requirement	is	too	demanding:	if	I	have	inconsistent	beliefs,	then	my	total	set	of	beliefs	is	irrational	to	some	degree,	but	it	doesn’t	follow	that	the	irrationality	can	be	traced	to	every	member	of	the	set.	In	particular,	the	rationality	of	my	belief	that	I’m	a	bad	driver	need	not	be	impugned	by	the	recalcitrance	of	my	irrational	belief	that	I’m	a	good	driver.30	If	I	can	know	a	commissive	Moorean	conjunction,	then	I	can	rationally	believe	it	when	it’s	true.	But	can	I	rationally	believe	it	when	it’s	false?	If	so,	then	believing	a	commissive	Moorean	conjunction	just	requires	believing	that	one	has	contradictory	beliefs.	The	problem	is	that	while	it’s	irrational	to	have	contradictory	beliefs,	it’s	not	obviously	irrational	to	believe	that	one	has	contradictory	beliefs.	So	how	can	we	explain	the	sense	that	believing	a	Moorean	conjunction	always	involves	some	degree	of	associated	irrationality?	The	rational	self-intimation	thesis	is	no	use	here.	If	I	self-consciously	believe	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	then	I	have	contradictory	beliefs:	I	believe	that	I	believe	that	p	while	also	believing	that	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	If	I	self-consciously	believe	a	commissive	Moorean	conjunction,	in	contrast,	then	I	merely	believe	that	I	have	contradictory	beliefs:	I	believe	that	I	believe	that	p	while	also	believing	that	I	believe	that	not-p.	But	this	fails	to	identify	any	irrationality	associated	with	believing	commissive	Moorean	conjunctions.	In	order	to	explain	this	associated	irrationality,	we	need	to	combine	the	rational	self-intimation	thesis	with	the	following	rational	infallibility	thesis:																																																									29	Thanks	to	Alex	Byrne	for	persuading	me	of	this.	See	Shoemaker	1996:	89-90,	Moran	2001:	85,	de	Almeida	2001:	43,	Gertler	2010:	139-41,	and	Coliva	2015:	178-9	for	similar	examples.	For	some	dissent,	see	Heal	1994:	11.	30	Compare	Arpaly	2003	on	inverse	akrasia:	the	rationality	of	helping	Jim	need	not	be	impugned	by	the	irrationality	of	my	belief	that	I	shouldn’t	help	Jim;	similarly,	the	rationality	of	my	believing	that	p	need	not	be	impugned	by	the	irrationality	of	my	belief	that	I	shouldn’t	believe	that	p.	
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The	rational	infallibility	thesis:	necessarily,	if	one	is	rational,	and	one	believes	that	one	believes	that	p,	then	one	believes	that	p.31		The	rational	infallibility	thesis	ensures	that	if	one	rationally	believes	a	commissive	Moorean	conjunction,	then	one	has	contradictory	beliefs.	Assuming	that	rationality	precludes	having	contradictory	beliefs,	it	follows	that	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	always	involves	some	associated	irrationality.	But	it	doesn’t	follow	that	my	Moorean	belief	is	itself	irrational.	It	may	instead	be	a	rational	response	to	irrationality	that	lies	elsewhere	in	my	belief	system.		
2.8. A	Simple	Solution	If	we	combine	the	rational	self-intimation	thesis	with	the	rational	infallibility	thesis,	then	we	arrive	at	the	following:		
The	rational	biconditional	thesis:	necessarily,	if	one	is	rational,	and	one	has	some	doxastic	attitude	towards	the	proposition	that	one	believes	that	p,	then	one	believes	that	p	if	and	only	if	one	believes	that	one	believes	that	p.		The	rational	biconditional	thesis	explains	why	there	is	always	some	degree	of	irrationality	associated	with	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	–	or	the	conjuncts	of	Moorean	conjunctions	–	of	either	omissive	or	commissive	forms.	Moreover,	the	simple	theory	explains	why	this	biconditional	thesis	is	true.	The	rational	self-intimation	thesis	is	true	because	the	fact	that	one	believes	that	p	makes	it	rational	to	believe	that	one	believes	that	p.	The	rational	infallibility	thesis	is	true	because	the	fact	that	one	doesn’t	believe	that	p	makes	it	rational	to	believe	that	one	doesn’t	believe	that	p.	The	simple	theory	implies	that	one	cannot	rationally	believe	that	one	doesn’t	believe	that	p	when	one	does	believe	that	p,	and	one	cannot	rationally	believe	that	one	believes	that	p	when	one	doesn’t	believe	that	p.	On	the																																																									31	Heal	1994:	22-3	endorses	a	psychological	version	of	the	infallibility	thesis	on	which	believing	that	one	believes	that	p	entails	believing	that	p.	
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simple	theory,	one	has	reasons	that	make	it	rational	to	believe	that	one	believes	that	
p	if	and	only	if	one	believes	that	p.	The	result	is	an	extended	argument	by	inference	to	the	best	explanation	for	extending	the	simple	theory	of	introspection	from	conscious	experience	to	belief.	One	might	challenge	this	argument	either	by	disputing	the	Moorean	data	to	be	explained	or	by	proposing	a	rival	explanation	of	the	Moorean	data.	In	section	3,	I’ll	consider	rival	explanations	that	appeal	to	the	transparency	of	belief,	but	I’ll	argue	that	the	simple	theory	of	introspection	provides	a	better	account	of	the	sense	in	which	belief	is	transparent.	Finally,	in	section	4,	I’ll	defend	my	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	against	the	objection	that	that	there	is	no	irrationality	involved	in	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	when	one	has	misleading	evidence	about	what	one	believes.		
3. The	Puzzle	of	Transparency	It	is	often	said	that	belief	is	transparent	in	the	sense	that	I	can	rationally	answer	the	question	whether	I	believe	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p.	This	idea	is	encapsulated	in	the	following	passage	from	Gareth	Evans:		 If	someone	asks	me	‘Do	you	think	there	is	going	to	be	a	third	world	war?’,	I	must	attend,	in	answering	him,	to	precisely	the	same	outward	phenomena	as	I	would	attend	to	if	I	were	answering	the	question	‘Will	there	be	a	third	world	war?’	I	get	myself	in	a	position	to	answer	the	question	whether	I	believe	that	p	by	putting	into	operation	whatever	procedure	I	have	for	answering	the	question	whether	p.	.	.	.	We	can	encapsulate	this	procedure	for	answering	questions	about	what	one	believes	in	the	following	simple	rule:	whenever	you	are	in	a	position	to	assert	that	p,	you	are	ipso	facto	in	a	position	to	assert	‘I	believe	that	p’.	(1982:	225-6)		Several	philosophers	have	argued	that	this	claim	that	belief	is	transparent	provides	the	key	to	solving	Moore’s	paradox.	In	this	section,	I’ll	criticize	some	of	these	rival	
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solutions	to	Moore’s	paradox	and	I’ll	argue	that	the	simple	theory	of	introspection	gives	a	better	account	of	the	sense	in	which	belief	is	transparent.32		
3.1. Evans’	Principle	Drawing	on	this	passage	from	Gareth	Evans,	John	Williams	(2004)	proposes	the	following	principle:		
Evans’	Principle:	Whatever	justifies	me	in	believing	that	p	also	justifies	me	in	believing	that	I	believe	that	p.	(2004:	348)		Williams	argues	that	Evans’	Principle	explains	why	I	cannot	have	justification	to	believe	a	Moorean	conjunction	of	the	omissive	form,	‘p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p’.	Williams	assumes,	quite	plausibly,	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	the	conjunction	only	if	I	have	justification	to	believe	each	of	its	conjuncts.	But	if	I	have	justification	to	believe	the	first	conjunct,	then	it	follows	by	Evans’	Principle	that	I	have	justification	to	disbelieve	the	second	conjunct.	I	cannot	also	have	justification	to	believe	the	second	conjunct	unless	I	have	justification	to	believe	contradictory	propositions.	According	to	Williams,	however,	“This	is	logically	impossible,	because	anything	that	justifies	me	in	believing	that	something	is	the	case	renders	me	unjustified	in	believing	that	it	is	not	the	case	and	vice	versa”	(2004:	352).33	The	main	problem	with	this	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	is	that	Evans’	Principle	is	false:	it	is	refuted	by	counterexamples	in	which	one’s	total	evidence	justifies	believing	that	p	without	also	thereby	justifying	the	belief	that	one	believes	that	p.	As	we	have	seen,	one’s	total	evidence	can	justify	believing	that	it	will	rain	without	thereby	justifying	the	belief	that	one	believes	that	it	will	rain.	Indeed,	one’s	total	evidence	can	justify	believing	that	it	will	rain	while	also	justifying	the	belief																																																									32	On	the	connection	between	transparency	and	Moore’s	paradox,	see	Gallois	1996,	Moran	2001	and	2003,	Williams	2004,	Byrne	2005	and	2011,	Fernandez	2005	and	2013,	Velleman	and	Shah	2005,	and	Silins	2012.	33	To	explain	the	commissive	form,	Williams	proposes	a	variant	of	Evans’s	principle:	“Whatever	justifies	me	in	believing	that	p	also	justifies	me	in	believing	that	I	do	not	believe	that	not-p”	(2004:	352).	
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that	one	doesn’t	believe	that	it	will	rain.	In	that	case,	one’s	total	body	of	evidence	justifies	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.	Jordi	Fernandez	(2013)	advances	a	related	proposal,	which	he	calls	the	Bypass	View:		
The	Bypass	View:	Normally,	if	S	believes	that	she	believes	that	p,	then	there	is	a	state	E	such	that	(a)	S’s	(higher-order)	belief	has	been	formed	on	the	basis	of	E	[and]	(b)	E	constitutes	grounds	for	the	belief	that	p	in	S.	(2013:	49)		On	this	view,	the	same	evidential	state	E	can	do	“double	duty”	in	justifying	not	only	the	belief	that	p,	but	also	the	belief	that	one	believes	that	p.	According	to	Fernandez,	this	happens	when	E	reliably	indicates	that	p,	while	also	reliably	indicating	that	one	believes	that	p.	However,	the	Bypass	View	avoids	the	objection	to	Evans’	Principle	because	these	reliable	indications	can	be	dissociated.	If	E	reliably	indicates	that	p,	but	does	not	reliably	indicate	that	one	believes	that	p,	then	one’s	evidence	can	justify	believing	that	p	without	also	justifying	the	belief	that	one	believes	that	p.34	Although	the	Bypass	View	avoids	the	objection	to	Evans’	Principle,	this	comes	at	the	cost	of	a	fully	general	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox.35	If	one’s	evidence	does	double	duty	in	justifying	the	belief	that	p	while	also	justifying	the	belief	that	one	believes	that	p,	then	it	cannot	justify	believing	the	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	that	p	and	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	But	the	problem	is	that	one’s	evidence	doesn’t	always	do	this	kind	of	double	duty	even	if	it	normally	does.	If	one’s	evidence	reliably	indicates	that	p,	while	also	reliably	indicating	that	one	does	not	believe	that	
p,	then	it	justifies	believing	the	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	that	p	and	I	don’t	
believe	that	p.	The	Bypass	View	can’t	explain	why	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	is	irrational	in	such	cases.		
																																																								34	See	Fernandez	2013:	63-6	in	reply	to	Zimmerman	2004.		35	See	Fernandez	2013:	126-38	for	his	proposed	solution	to	Moore’s	paradox	and	a	comparison	with	Evans’	principle.	
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3.2. Rational	Entitlement	Richard	Moran	(2001)	claims	that	it	is	a	normative	ideal	of	rationality	that	one’s	beliefs	are	transparent	in	the	sense	that	one	can	answer	the	question	whether	one	believes	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p.	At	the	same	time,	he	notes	that	there	are	failures	of	transparency	in	which	one	knows	one	has	recalcitrant	beliefs	that	are	not	supported	by	the	evidence.	For	instance,	he	writes,	“I	can	well	imagine	the	accumulated	evidence	suggesting	both	that	I	believe	that	it’s	raining,	and	that	it	is	not	in	fact	raining”	(2001:	84).	At	the	same	time,	he	notes	that	this	possibility	“clashes	with	the	conception	of	oneself	as	a	rational	agent”	(2001:	84).	The	claim	is	that	transparency	is	a	rational	ideal	that	we	don’t	always	satisfy.	The	challenge	here	is	to	explain	why	transparency	is	an	ideal	of	rationality.	The	puzzle	of	transparency	(as	it	has	become	known)	is	to	explain	why	it	is	rational	to	answer	the	question	whether	one	believes	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p.	This	puzzle	is	pressing	because,	as	we	have	seen,	the	evidence	that	justifies	believing	that	p	need	not	thereby	justify	believing	that	one	believes	that	p.	In	the	following	passage,	Moran	articulates	this	puzzle	and	his	solution:		 What	right	have	I	to	think	that	my	reflection	on	the	reasons	in	favor	of	P	(which	is	one	subject-matter)	has	anything	to	do	with	the	question	of	what	my	actual	belief	about	P	is	(which	is	quite	a	different	subject-matter)?	.	.	.	I	
would	have	a	right	to	assume	that	my	reflection	on	the	reasons	in	favor	of	rain	provided	an	answer	to	the	question	of	what	my	belief	is,	if	I	could	assume	that	what	my	belief	here	is	was	something	determined	by	the	conclusion	of	my	reflection	on	those	reasons.	(2003:	405)		Moran	claims	that	it’s	rational	to	answer	the	question	whether	one	believes	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p	when,	and	only	when,	it’s	rational	to	assume	that	one’s	beliefs	about	whether	p	are	settled	by	one’s	reflection	on	the	reasons	that	bear	on	the	rationality	of	believing	that	p.	In	other	words,	the	rationality	of	making	the	transition	relies	on	the	rationality	of	assuming	that	one’s	beliefs	are	settled	by	one’s	reflection	on	the	evidence.	
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Quassim	Cassam	(2014:	Ch.	9)	raises	several	problems	for	Moran’s	proposal.	First,	the	Generality	Problem:	it	cannot	be	extended	to	explain	self-knowledge	of	mental	states,	such	as	conscious	sensations,	which	are	not	responsive	to	one’s	reflection	on	reasons.	Second,	the	Immediacy	Problem:	it	cannot	explain	why	knowledge	of	one’s	beliefs	should	count	as	immediate	or	non-inferential,	rather	than	inferentially	mediated,	insofar	as	it	depends	on	the	rationality	of	assuming	that	one’s	beliefs	are	settled	by	one’s	reflection	on	evidence.		And	third,	the	Matching	Problem:	it	cannot	explain	our	introspective	knowledge	of	what	we	believe	when	we	know	that	our	beliefs	are	not	settled	by	our	reflection	on	the	evidence.	The	third	problem	is	particularly	damaging	to	the	prospects	for	solving	Moore’s	paradox.	Suppose	I	know	my	beliefs	about	my	own	abilities	tend	to	be	
recalcitrant	in	the	sense	that	they	are	impervious	to	the	conclusions	that	I	draw	on	the	basis	of	my	reflections	on	the	evidence.	I	conclude	that	the	evidence	justifies	believing	that	I’m	a	bad	driver,	but	I	suspect	rationally	–	though,	as	it	happens,	mistakenly	–	that	this	fails	to	have	any	impact	on	what	I	believe.	In	that	case,	it	is	not	rational,	all	things	considered,	to	assume	that	my	belief	is	settled	by	my	reflection	on	the	evidence.	On	Moran’s	account,	then,	it	is	not	rational	for	me	to	answer	the	question	whether	I	believe	that	I’m	a	bad	driver	by	answering	the	question	whether	I’m	a	bad	driver.	But	then	what	explains	the	irrationality	of	believing	the	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	“I’m	a	bad	driver,	but	I	don’t	believe	I’m	a	bad	driver”?		
3.3. Self-Verifying	Rules	Alex	Byrne	(2005,	2011)	claims	that	I	can	know	what	I	believe	by	making	“transparent	inferences”	from	premises	about	the	world	to	conclusions	about	my	own	beliefs.	For	instance,	I	can	know	that	I	believe	there	will	be	a	third	world	war	by	inferring	this	conclusion	from	the	premise	that	there	will	be	a	third	world	war.	More	generally,	I	can	know	what	I	believe	by	making	inferences	in	accordance	with	what	Andre	Gallois	(1996:	46-7)	calls	the	doxastic	schema:		
The	doxastic	schema:	p,	therefore	I	believe	that	p.		
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As	Gallois	notes,	the	doxastic	schema	is	neither	deductively	nor	inductively	valid:	it	“does	not	fit	any	standard	pattern	of	good	inference”	(1996:	47).	So	the	puzzle	of	transparency,	within	this	framework,	is	to	explain	why	reasoning	in	accord	with	the	doxastic	schema	is	capable	of	yielding	knowledge	and	justified	belief.	Byrne’s	solution	is	that	the	doxastic	schema	is	strongly	self-verifying	in	the	sense	that	reasoning	in	accord	with	it	is	guaranteed	to	yield	true	beliefs.	He	writes,	“If	one	reasons	in	accord	with	the	doxastic	schema,	and	infers	that	one	believes	that	
p	from	the	premise	that	p,	then	one’s	second-order	belief	is	true,	because	inference	from	a	premiss	entails	belief	in	that	premiss”	(2011:	206).	I’ll	consider	two	objections	to	Byrne’s	solution.36	The	first	objection	is	that	my	knowledge	of	what	I	believe	is	not	based	on	inference	from	what	I	believe,	since	I	can	know	what	I	believe	even	when	my	belief	is	false.	The	key	assumption	here	is	that	I	can’t	acquire	knowledge	by	inference	from	a	false	premise.	Gilbert	Harman	(1973:	47)	justifies	this	assumption	by	its	role	in	explaining	Gettier’s	counterexamples	to	the	analysis	of	knowledge	as	justified	true	belief.	In	each	of	Gettier’s	original	examples,	the	subject	lacks	knowledge	because	his	justified	true	belief	is	inferred	from	a	false	premise.	Byrne	(2011:	206-7)	replies	that	one	can	acquire	knowledge	by	inference	from	a	false	premise	so	long	as	one’s	belief	is	safe	from	error	in	the	sense	that	it	could	not	easily	have	been	false	given	the	way	it	is	formed.37	We	can	explain	why	subjects	lack	knowledge	in	Gettier	cases	because	their	beliefs	are	not	safe	from	error.	In	contrast,	reasoning	in	accord	with	the	doxastic	schema	yields	beliefs	that	are	safe	from	error	even	when	they	are	inferred	from	a	false	premise.	The	second	objection	is	that	I	can	know	what	I	believe	when	my	beliefs	are	not	only	false,	but	also	unjustified.	The	key	assumption	here	is	that	I	cannot	acquire	knowledge	by	inference	from	a	premise	that	is	not	only	false,	but	also	unjustified.	
																																																								36	Both	objections	are	raised	by	Shoemaker	2009:	36	and	Silins	2012:	304-5.	37	See	Warfield	2005	for	alleged	cases	of	knowledge	by	inference	from	false	premises.	Arguably,	however,	in	each	of	his	examples,	there	is	some	true	premise	that	is	dispositionally	believed	and	that	is	causally	relevant	in	explaining	how	the	subject	acquires	inferential	knowledge.	
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This	is	because	justified	belief	is	required	for	knowledge,	but	a	belief	cannot	be	justified	by	inference	from	unjustified	premises.	Byrne’s	appeal	to	safety	is	no	use	here,	since	safety	from	error	is	not	sufficient	for	justified	belief.	Suppose	I	make	inferences	in	accordance	with	the	following	schema:	if	x	is	water,	then	x	is	composed	of	H2O	molecules.	My	conclusions	are	no	less	safe	than	my	premises,	but	if	I	know	nothing	about	chemistry,	then	my	conclusions	are	not	justified	even	when	my	premises	are.	We	can	make	the	same	point	using	standard	counterexamples	to	externalist	theories	of	justification:	for	instance,	BonJour’s	(1985:	Ch.	3)	clairvoyant,	Norman,	is	not	justified	in	believing	that	the	President	is	in	New	York	even	if	his	belief	is	formed	on	the	basis	of	a	reliable	clairvoyant	mechanism	and	is	therefore	safe	from	error.	If	safety	is	not	sufficient	for	justified	belief,	then	we	need	an	alternative	to	Byrne’s	inferential	account	of	how	we	can	know	what	we	believe.		
3.4. A	Simple	Solution	All	of	these	proposals	deserve	more	extended	discussion	than	I	can	give	them	here.	Even	so,	the	problems	I	have	raised	are	serious	enough	to	motivate	the	search	for	an	alternative	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	transparency.	I’ll	now	argue	that	the	simple	theory	solves	the	puzzle	of	transparency	in	a	way	that	avoids	these	problems.	A	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	transparency	must	explain	how	it	can	be	rational	to	answer	the	question	whether	one	believes	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p.	Unlike	Byrne’s	account,	the	simple	theory	explains	why	the	transition	from	believing	that	p	to	believing	that	one	believes	that	p	is	not	merely	reliable	or	safe	from	error,	but	also	rational	or	justified.	The	transition	is	rational	because	the	fact	that	one	believes	that	p	is	an	introspective	reason	to	believe	that	one	believes	that	p.	Moreover,	this	introspective	reason	puts	one	in	a	position	to	know	by	means	of	introspection	that	one	believes	that	p.	Unlike	Moran’s	account,	the	simple	theory	does	not	rely	on	the	assumption	that	we	are	rationally	entitled	to	assume	that	our	beliefs	are	settled	by	our	reflection	on	the	evidence.	The	simple	theory	can	explain	how	we	know	what	we	believe	even	when	we	know	that	our	beliefs	are	unresponsive	to	reflection.	On	the	simple	theory,	
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rationality	requires	self-knowledge,	but	self-knowledge	doesn’t	require	that	one	is	rational,	or	that	one	is	rationally	entitled	to	assume	so.	The	simple	theory	also	has	the	advantage	of	generality:	it	explains	our	introspective	knowledge	of	what	we	believe	on	a	more	general	model	that	applies	equally	to	our	introspective	knowledge	of	conscious	experience.	On	the	simple	theory,	the	transition	from	believing	that	p	to	believing	that	one	believes	that	p	is	justified	in	much	the	same	way	as	the	transition	from	feeling	pain	to	believing	that	one	feels	pain.	On	Moran’s	account,	in	contrast,	our	introspective	knowledge	of	rational	attitudes	cannot	be	assimilated	to	the	same	model	as	our	introspective	knowledge	of	conscious	sensations.38	Moreover,	the	simple	theory	explains	why	the	transition	from	believing	that	
p	to	believing	that	one	believes	that	p	is	non-inferential.	It’s	not	justified	in	the	same	way	as	an	inference	where	the	premise	deductively	entails	or	inductively	raises	the	probability	of	the	conclusion.	The	justification	for	the	transition	cannot	be	explained	on	the	model	of	deductive	or	inductive	inference,	but	is	rather	an	instance	of	a	more	general	pattern	of	non-inferentially	justified	transitions	from	mental	states	to	beliefs	about	those	mental	states.	The	simple	theory,	like	Evans’	principle,	explains	why	rationality	requires	that	one	believes	that	p	if	and	only	if	one	believes	that	one	believes	that	p.	However,	the	form	of	the	explanation	is	quite	different.	According	to	the	simple	theory,	one’s	introspective	reason	to	believe	that	one	believes	that	p	has	its	source	in	one’s	belief	that	p,	rather	than	in	whatever	justifies	one’s	belief	that	p.	This	has	at	least	three	advantages.	First,	it	means	that	the	simple	theory	can	be	extended	to	account	for	our	introspective	knowledge	of	unjustified	as	well	as	justified	beliefs.	Second,	it	avoids	counterexamples	in	which	one’s	total	evidence	justifies	believing	that	p	without	thereby	justifying	the	belief	that	one	believes	that	p.	And	third,	it	explains	how	there	can	be	finkish	evidence	for	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction.																																																									38	See	Moran	2001:	xxxiii.	Compare	Boyle	2009,	who	argues	that	there	are	two	fundamentally	different	kinds	of	self-knowledge:	an	active	kind	through	which	we	know	our	own	beliefs	and	judgments,	and	a	passive	kind	through	which	we	know	our	conscious	sensations.	
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Finally,	the	simple	theory	explains	the	sense	in	which	introspection	involves	looking	outwards	towards	the	world,	rather	than	looking	inwards	towards	one’s	own	mind.	As	Evans	writes,	“in	making	a	self-ascription	of	belief,	one’s	eyes	are,	so	to	speak,	or	occasionally	literally,	directed	outward	–	upon	the	world”	(1982:	225).	On	the	simple	theory,	one’s	belief	that	one	believes	that	p	is	rationally	based	directly	on	the	belief	that	p,	rather	than	any	introspective	representation	of	one’s	belief	that	
p.	The	transition	from	believing	that	p	to	believing	that	one	believes	that	p	is	world-directed	insofar	as	the	belief	that	p	is	itself	world-directed.	More	generally,	the	transition	from	being	in	a	mental	state	to	believing	that	one	is	in	that	mental	state	is	world-directed	insofar	as	the	mental	state	in	question	is	world-directed.	There	is	no	further	explanatory	work	to	be	done	by	an	appeal	to	transparency	that	cannot	be	accommodated	within	the	simple	theory	of	introspection.		
4. Ideal	and	Non-Ideal	Rationality	In	this	section,	I’ll	respond	to	an	objection	to	the	simple	theory.	The	objection	is	that	I	can	have	misleading	evidence	about	what	I	believe,	just	as	I	can	have	misleading	evidence	about	what	others	believe.	Moreover,	misleading	evidence	can	rationally	support	false	beliefs	about	what	I	believe,	just	as	it	can	rationally	support	false	beliefs	about	what	others	believe.	Since	the	simple	theory	rules	out	the	possibility	of	rational	false	beliefs	about	what	you	believe,	it	thereby	seems	to	ignore	the	rational	force	of	misleading	evidence	about	what	you	believe.	There	are	two	kinds	of	cases	to	consider.	In	cases	of	the	first	kind,	I	believe	that	p,	but	I	have	misleading	evidence	that	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	Many	cases	of	self-deception	fit	this	description.	So,	for	example,	I	might	know	“deep	down”	that	I’m	an	addict	although	I	won’t	admit	this	to	myself	or	anyone	else.	Suppose	my	knowledge	is	so	deeply	repressed	that	the	relevant	belief	is	blocked	from	playing	its	normal	functional	role	in	action	and	reasoning.	In	that	case,	it	might	seem	rational	for	me	to	believe	that	I	don’t	believe	that	I’m	an	addict	when	in	fact	I	do	believe	this.	In	cases	of	the	second	kind,	I	don’t	believe	that	p,	but	I	have	misleading	evidence	that	I	do	believe	that	p.	Shoemaker	(1996:	90)	gives	an	example	in	which	a	normally	reliable	psychiatrist	mixes	up	her	files	and	mistakenly	informs	me	that	I	
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have	a	repressed	belief	that	I	was	adopted.	At	the	same	time,	I	know	full	well	that	I	wasn’t	adopted.	In	that	case,	it	might	seem	rational	for	me	to	believe	that	I	believe	I	was	adopted	when	in	fact	I	don’t	believe	this	at	all.	These	cases	pull	in	two	different	directions.	On	the	one	hand,	it	seems	irrational	to	ignore	misleading	evidence	about	what	you	believe.	On	the	other	hand,	taking	this	kind	of	evidence	into	consideration	can	lead	one	into	a	Moorean	predicament	that	seems	irrational.	For	instance,	in	the	first	case,	I	might	believe	the	conjuncts	of	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction,	“I’m	an	addict,	but	I	don’t	believe	I’m	an	addict.”	Similarly,	in	the	second	case,	I	might	falsely	believe	a	commissive	Moorean	conjunction,	“I	believe	that	I	was	adopted,	but	I	wasn’t	adopted”.	One	reaction	is	to	deny	that	there	is	always	some	degree	of	irrationality	associated	with	believing	propositions	that	entail	Moorean	conjunctions.	But	this	conflicts	with	the	intuitive	reaction	that	generates	Moore’s	paradox	in	the	first	place.	At	a	minimum,	there	remains	a	challenge	to	explain	when	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	involves	some	associated	irrationality	and	when	it	doesn’t.	I	remain	skeptical	that	a	principled	and	well	motivated	account	can	be	given.	My	own	reaction	is	to	maintain	that	there	is	always	some	irrationality	associated	with	believing	Moorean	conjunctions,	while	explaining	away	the	rational	force	of	misleading	evidence	in	terms	of	a	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality.	The	basis	of	the	distinction	is	that	non-ideal	standards	take	into	consideration	one’s	human	limitations,	whereas	ideal	standards	abstract	away	from	them.	As	a	result,	these	standards	can	conflict:	Moorean	incoherence	can	be	prohibited	by	ideal	standards	of	rationality	even	if	it	is	sometimes	permitted	or	even	required	by	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality.	The	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality	is	most	familiar	from	discussion	of	the	thesis	that	rationality	requires	logical	omniscience.	Our	best	formal	theories	of	rationality	imply	that	rational	agents	are	logically	omniscient	and	infallible	in	the	sense	that	they	are	certain	of	all	logical	truths.	On	this	view,	rationality	is	inconsistent	with	uncertainty	or	error	about	logic.	Plausibly,	however,	there	can	be	misleading	evidence	that	makes	it	rational	to	be	uncertain	or	mistaken	about	logic,	such	as	expert	testimony	or	evidence	that	one	has	taken	
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reason-distorting	drugs.	The	thesis	that	rationality	requires	logical	omniscience	therefore	seems	to	ignore	the	rational	force	of	this	misleading	evidence.39	We	can	use	the	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality	to	defend	the	thesis	that	rationality	requires	logical	omniscience.	Ideal	standards	require	that	one	is	perfectly	responsive	to	the	logical	facts,	and	hence	that	one	is	never	mistaken	or	uncertain	about	logic.	But	since	non-ideal	agents	cannot	satisfy	these	ideal	standards,	we	can	evaluate	them	by	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality	that	take	their	limited	capacities	into	consideration.	These	non-ideal	standards	sometimes	require	non-ideal	agents	to	depart	from	ideal	standards	by	being	uncertain	or	mistaken	about	logic.	We	can	use	the	same	distinction	to	defend	the	thesis	that	rationality	requires	
doxastic	omniscience.	Ideal	standards	require	that	one	is	perfectly	responsive	to	the	psychological	facts,	and	hence	that	one	is	never	mistaken	or	uncertain	about	what	one	believes.	But	since	non-ideal	agents	cannot	satisfy	these	ideal	standards,	we	can	evaluate	them	by	non-ideal	standards	of	rationality	that	take	their	limited	capacities	into	consideration.	These	non-ideal	standards	sometimes	require	non-ideal	agents	to	depart	from	ideal	standards	by	being	uncertain	or	mistaken	about	their	beliefs.	Ideal	agents	are	perfectly	responsive	to	the	evidence	that	is	constituted	by	logical	and	psychological	facts,	but	we	non-ideal	agents	are	not.	Given	our	non-ideal	predicament,	it	is	not	advisable	for	us	to	try	to	imitate	ideal	agents.	Sometimes	it	is	more	advisable	to	do	what	we	know	ideal	agents	would	never	do.	In	particular,	sometimes	the	best	strategy	for	us	to	adopt	is	to	form	our	beliefs	in	response	to	empirical	proxies	that	indicate	the	logical	or	psychological	facts	with	some	degree	of	reliability.	When	these	proxies	are	reliable,	or	rationally	believed	to	be	reliable,	responding	to	them	can	serve	as	an	imperfect	and	indirect	way	of	responding	to	the	logical	or	psychological	facts	that	constitute	our	evidence.	So	the	claim	is	that	doxastic	omniscience	is	a	rational	ideal	in	much	the	same	way	as	logical	omniscience.	We	arrive	at	this	conclusion	by	treating	Moorean	incoherence	on	a	par	with	logical	incoherence.	Moorean	incoherence,	like	logical																																																									39	See	Christensen	2007	for	this	challenge	and	Smithies	2015b	for	my	response.	
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incoherence,	is	never	rational	by	ideal	standards,	but	it	can	be	rational	by	non-ideal	standards	that	take	our	human	limitations	into	account.	I’ll	close	with	two	big	picture	questions	that	deserve	more	extended	discussion	elsewhere:		 (1) If	rationality	does	not	require	knowing	about	the	external	world,	then	why	does	it	require	knowing	about	the	internal	world?	(2) Does	rationality	require	knowing	about	all	of	our	internal	states,	or	just	some	of	them?	If	some,	but	not	all,	then	how	can	we	demarcate	the	boundary?		My	answers	to	both	questions	draw	upon	a	background	theoretical	commitment	to	access	internalism.	According	to	access	internalism,	rationality	requires	knowing	about	the	internal	states	that	determine	what	rationality	requires	of	you.	It	doesn’t	require	knowing	about	the	external	world.	And	it	doesn’t	require	knowing	about	internal	states	that	play	no	role	in	determining	what	rationality	requires	of	you.	Rationality	requires	knowing	about	your	beliefs	and	conscious	experiences	because	of	their	role	in	determining	what	rationality	requires	you	to	believe	and	do.40	
																																																								40	I	am	grateful	to	audiences	at	the	University	of	Oxford	in	June	2013,	the	University	of	Syracuse	in	August	2013,	the	New	York	Institute	of	Philosophy	in	November	2013,	the	University	of	Bergen	in	May	2015,	and	the	University	of	Oslo	in	July	2015.	Many	thanks	especially	to	David	Barnett,	Matthew	Benton,	Alex	Byrne,	Paul	Egre,	Ole	Koksvik,	Jack	Lyons,	Ram	Neta,	Matthew	Parrott,	Christopher	Peacocke,	Nicholas	Silins,	and	Sydney	Shoemaker	for	helpful	comments	and	discussion.	
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